Aquinas Reader On Aristotle or The Philosopher

St. Thomas Aquinas is often referred to as one of the greatest commentators of Aristotle. The aim of this work is to make St. Thomas the philosopher more accessible for a concentrated study. In order to accomplish this, his principle work, the Summa Theologica has been currated to only sections including the mention of 'Aristotle' or 'The Philosopher'. This subset of articles has been further divided by book from the Aristotelian corpus. Keywords and a simple summary have been added to enrich the learning experience with overarching snapshots. We have added a reference distribution to illustrate the prominence of his citations. The sections presented are as they appear in the Summa Theologica for each reference book identified by headers. Each reference book in study is highlighted throughout in yellow for convenience. Books identified with multiple matching references have been adjudicated arbitrarily.

This is a smaller reader of Aquinas in so far as Aristotle is referenced in **De Memor. et Remin..**

We hope you enjoy this study of Aristotle as he is depicted through the lens of St. Thomas.

# De Memor. et Remin.

**Keywords:**

memories, power, impressed, remember, wherefore, fathers, unwonted, objects, proposition, image, entirely, easily, sensitive, iii, luke, preserves, man, restores, souls, natural, things, good, acts, need, apprehensive.

## Volume 4 - Question 8. The grace of Christ, as He is the head of the Church

**Article 3. Whether Christ is the Head of all men?**

Reply to Objection 3. The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from the Philosopher (**De Memor. et Remin.** ii). Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.

## Volume 4 - Question 25. The adoration of Christ

**Article 3. Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?**

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (**De Memor. et Remin.** i), there is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image in so far as it is the image of something else. And between these movements there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to Christ's image, as a thing—for instance, carved or painted wood: because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follow therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ's image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of "latria," it follows that His image should be adored with the adoration of "latria."

## Volume 3 - Question 49. Each quasi-integral part of prudence

**Article 1. Whether memory is a part of prudence?**

There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (**De Memor. et Remin.** ii): "Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other." Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that "anxiety preserves the figures of images entire." Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that "reflection preserves memories," because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) "custom is a second nature": wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.

Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (**De Memor. et Remin.** i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

## Volume 2 - Question 50. The subject of habits

**Article 3. Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?**

Reply to Objection 3. The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (**De Memor. et Remin.** ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

## Volume 2 - Question 51. The cause of habits, as to their formation

**Article 3. Whether a habit can be caused by one act?**

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [See I:79:2 ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (**De Memor. et Remin.** 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

## Volume 5 - Question 70. The quality of the soul after leaving the body, and of the punishment inflicted on it by material fire

**Article 2. Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?**

Objection 4. Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as proved in **De Memor. et Remin.** i. Now separated souls will actually remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton (Luke 16:25): "Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime." Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a sensitive power.

## Volume 1 - Question 78. The specific powers of the soul

**Article 4. Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?**

Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (**De Memor. et Remin.** i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.

## Volume 1 - Question 77. The powers of the soul in general

**Article 8. Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?**

Objection 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (**De Memor. et Remin.** 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.